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A Reprise of the Case of Eads v. Brazelton
Barlow Burke, Jr. *
For many first-year law students, the course in real property begins with the case of Eads v. Brazelton.I The choice is
well-considered, because the case allows the teacher to delve
simultaneously into the laws of prior possession and finder's
rights. Eads is a Mid-South version of Pierson v. Post,2 but the
suit is less shallow and the facts more appealing; something of
value, other than a hunter's wounded pride, is at stake.
Although decided in 1861, Eads continues to serve as authority for clearing title by abandonment. Additionally, the
case enjoys renewed application for its rule of capture. Modem salvage cases rely on Eads to settle disputes between competing claimants. This demonstrates the continuity of
property law; that a case decided in the nineteenth century
can serve as the lens through which twentieth century facts
can be analyzed is a tribute to the flexibility and continuing
vitality of cases such as Eads.
I. JAMES EADS, SALVOR
The backdrop to the Eads case is fascinating, and one of
the litigants was a famous man in his day. James Buchanan
Eads was an engineer and inventor. He was born on May 23,
1820, in Lawrenceburg, Indiana, and named after a second
cousin from Pennsylvania who was later to become the fifteenth President of the United States-James Buchanan.
With his family, Eads arrived in St. Louis in 1833. As he
stepped off the steamboat, it promptly burst into flames, burning the boat to the waterline, and with it, the family's possessions. With a needy family to help support, Eads resorted to
the business of the poor-but-determined by peddling apples in
*

Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The American University,

Washington, D.C.
1. 22 Ark. 499 (1861), reprinted in J. CRIBBIT, C. JOHNSON, R. FINDLEY & E.
SMITH, PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS

97 (6th ed., 1990).

2. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805) (dealing with a hunter in pursuit of a fox when
another hunter killed it). See infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
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the streets. For the next five years, he clerked in Williams and
Duhring's dry-goods store. Perhaps precognitively, Eads
spent his spare time building mechanical inventions and
model steamboats. Eads' employer noticed and shared his interest in mechanical things. He let the young man use his library; there, surrounded by books on mechanical subjects,
Eads educated himself in engineering.
In 1838, Eads signed on as a mud clerk or purser on a
steamboat beginning what was to be a twenty-year career on
the Mississippi River and its tributaries.4 While boating between St. Louis and New Orleans, Eads realized that the river
was replete with wrecks. 5 For the next three years, he
tinkered with the machinery and apparatus needed for a diving bell to salvage them. 6
Eads obtained a patent on a diving bell, and in 1842
formed a partnership with the firm of Case & Nelson, boatbuilders in St. Louis. He was twenty-two at the time. Calvin
Case and William Nelson were established boat builders.
Eads brashly offered them a partnership in a salvage venture if
they would build a boat of his own design. Eads called it a
submarine. It was a modified "snag" boat which for years had
been used to free the River channel of the underwater snags
and logs so dangerous to wooden-hulled steamboats. The
3. Eads' biography reads like a Horatio Alger story, and indeed he was the subject of such a treatment. See L. How, JAMES B. EADS (1900). See also F. DORSEY,
ROAD TO THE SEA: THE STORY OF JAMES B. EADS AND THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER

(1947). For testimony of the lure of the River for those living along its banks, see S.
CLEMONS [MARK TWAIN], LIFE ON THE Mississippi, ch. 4 (1874) ("When I was a boy,
there was but one permanent ambition among my comrades .... That was, to be a
steamboatman.").
4. 3 DICTIONARY OF AM. BIOGRAPHY 587 (1930). See also 5 NATIONAL CYCLOPAEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 134 (1907).

5.

In low water season "....

nearly every day the St. Louis papers reported steam-

boats snagged and sunk." W. HAVINGHURST, VOICES ON THE RIVER: THE STORY OF

THE MISSISSIPPI WATERWAYS 178 (1964). See generally G.B. TINDALL, 1 AMERICA: A
NARRATIVE HISTORY 455-458 (1988).
In 1836, three hundred sixty-one steamboats were registered to ply western rivers.
G.B. TINDALL, supra, at 455. The many boats meant heavy competition for cargoes.
Mississippi steamboats used steam at a higher pressure than was used in boats on Eastern rivers, so the average life of a western river boat was four years, whereas an Eastern
boat lasted seven. J. BURNS, THE VINEYARD OF LIBERTY 300 (1982). Add to this the
shifting sandbars, snags, and other obstacles in the Mississippi, and one can understand
the high incidence of sunken ships.
6. L. How, supra note 3 at 8-9.
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boat was a double-hulled, wooden catamaran, with a deck
bridging the hulls. The deck contained an opening through
which Eads' diving bell could be raised and lowered.7
Eads' first job was to raise a cargo of lead8 in the upper
Mississippi River. Rapid currents prevented Eads' diver from
reaching the wreckage; Eads designed a device to enable descent through the fifteen feet of swiftly moving water. Eads
purchased a forty-gallon whiskey hogshead, suspended a seat
within it and placed lead weights around it, attached airpumps and placed it on a derrick. This device proved successful. After experimenting with the handling of this rig, Eads
and his crew were able to raise all of the cargo. 9
Nothing is known of the safety record of workers using
Eads' first bell or any of its more sophisticated successors. At
depths of approximately thirty feet, the water pressure became
dangerous to the workers within the bell.' 0 Many divers of
the day were afraid to venture too deeply into the murky, siltladen currents, so Eads often did his own diving. He was not
afraid to walk the River bottom, even at full flood, at depths
of more than sixty feet."
Eads' firm depended on good contacts with river pilots
and crewmen for information concerning wrecks. Insurance
companies, having paid the claims of lost boat and cargo owners, engaged him to salvage in exchange for half of the cargo
7. Id. at 9.
8. Id. at 9-10. Eads' relationship with lead became somewhat symbiotic. Eads
had plied this stretch of the river for three years as a purser on boats loaded with lead.
Much later, a cargo of lead was to be the object of his salvage efforts, resulting in the
litigation for which he would achieve legal fame.
Lead cargoes were the product of a mining boom in northwestern Illinois in the
1830s. In 1822, a band of Kentucky miners established the first such activity around
Galena, Illinois, on the Mississippi River. By 1830, the town had a population of about
10,000 and shipped about 7500 tons of lead down the River to New Orleans. C.M.
CARVER, AMERICAN REGIONAL DIALECTS 67 (1987). See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
9. L. How, supra note 3, at 9-11, recounts this event. See also H. MILLER & Q.
SCOTT, THE EADS BRIDGE 68-74 (1979) (describing Eads' salvage ventures).
10. Later, during the construction of the Eads Bridge at St. Louis, Eads' crews
suffered 15 fatalities from the "bends," a blockage of oxygen in the blood caused by
rapid decompression. The first of Eads' fatalities occurred at a depth of 94 feet, where
the pressure was 44 pounds per square inch. D. MCCULLOUGH, THE GREAT BRIDGE
187, 316 (1972). A recounting of the medical problems of workers on this project appears id. at 309-11.
11. Id. at 181; see also L. How, supra note 3, at 10- l.
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raised. His fees ranged from 20 to 70 percent of the cargo
raised. The states abutting the River often had short statutes
of limitations on the assertion of owners' rights in wrecks and
cargoes. This meant that a salvor could shortly claim a right
12
of possession in whatever he could raise from the River bed.
River salvage was a risky but profitable venture, and
Eads' engagement in this business was sporadic but recurring
over the following decades. Eads estimated that during his
salvage years, he made over 500 dives in his bell. His method
was to attach the submarine to a line strung from one shore to
the other and move the submarine along the line with the bell
under the boat and the diver walking the bottom under it.
Once the opposite shore was reached, the line was moved
downstream and the walk repeated in the opposite direction.' 3
After his first successes as a salvor, James Eads turned
his attention to other things. From 1845 to 1848, he attempted unsuccessfully to manufacture glass, a venture that
cost Eads a fortune and left him in debt. Eads then turned his
attention to the improvement of navigation on Midwestern
rivers. It was during this period in Eads' career, in 1855, that
he began to salvage a cargo of lead from the sunken steamship
America in the Mississippi River.1 4 Eads' efforts resulted in
the now famous conflict and court battle with Brazelton over
who had superior rights to the lead.
At this point, it is helpful to discuss the development of
the lead mining industry in Illinois and its effect on river
transportation. In the upper Mississippi River region around
what is now Galena, Illinois, extensive mining operations were
undertaken during the first half of the nineteenth century.15
Ore deposits of lead and zinc lay near the surface and were
known by the Indians and by French explorers during the seventeenth century. The accessibility of the lead engendered a
rush of squatter miners to the region in the early 1820s.16
Most of the mines were first worked from the bountiful sur12. L. How, supra note 3, at 11-12, 17-18.
13. Id. at 18.
14. Id. at 16-17.
15. The basis for the following discussion concerning lead production is the Federal Writers Project, Galena Guide (Works Progress Admin. 1937).
16. Id. at 30. By 1823, 425,000 pounds of ore had been shipped from the booming
settlement; also in that year, the first steamboat docked at a townsite in the Galena
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face deposits. There were at least fifty of these "diggings" in
1829. After the surface deposits were fully mined, deep mines
became the pattern. Mining became more labor- and capitalintensive.' 7 By the 1840's, there were approximately twenty
lead smelters operating in the Galena region, with the largest
smelter having the capacity to produce 15,000 pounds of ore
daily. However,
lead production waxed and waned with the
8
economy. '

Peak production for the region was in 1845, when over
fifty-four million pounds of lead were produced, but during
the late 1840s and 1850s, the production and exportation of
lead plunged. The region's population turned from mining to
agriculture, and the California Gold Rush lured many of the
squatters and fortune-hunters away from the region. The capital investment required for deep mining concentrated the
wealth of the region's mining industry in the hands of the
owners of the smelters. Overland transportation, first by cart
and wagon and later by railroad, competed with the river
boats for the cargoes. By the 1850s, there was less lead to take
down river."' This decline in the regional lead industry may
have had an impact on the court's decision in the Eads case.
By 1857, prosperity and ill health prompted Eads' premature retirement from the salvage business. Eads was then
River, a tributary of the Mississippi. By 1829, thirteen million pounds of lead had been
mined and shipped from Galena. Id. at 22.
In the next year, 1824, the United States government devised a mineral lease system for the lands surrounding Galena, with royalty rates of first ten and later six percent. The system was largely a failure and the lands were overrun with squatters who
refused to pay royalties. Many of the miners were seasonal migrants-up from Missouri in the spring, and, like the "sucker" fish in the Mississippi, returning south in the
fall. Others were Kentuckians with previous experience as miners in that state. Id. at
23.
17. If an assay at the surface looked favorable, a test boring was made. If the
result of the boring was favorable, then a four by six foot shaft was sunk ten to twenty
feet into the earth and cribbed with timber. Galena dolomite, in which the ore was
encased, was usually found at a level of twenty feet. Mine tunnels'were then sent out
from the bottom of the shaft, often for several hundred feet. The tunnels were ten to
fifteen feet in height and from five to forty feet wide, depending upon the vein being
mined. Id. at 41.
18. After a high in 1829 of thirteen million pounds, over-production and the Black
Hawk War precipitated a drop in production to only five million produced pounds in
1832. In 1841, ten million pounds of lead were produced, most of which was exported,
and transported by steamboats on the River. Id. at 29.
19. Id. at 32.
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thirty seven years old. For the years during which the litigation in Eads v. Brazelton was conducted, he was a country
gentleman. Living and gardening in and around a large house
south of St. Louis, Eads continued to pursue his self-taught
engineering education.2°
During the Civil War, however, he built ironclad gun
boats to aid the Union cause. These boats predated the more
famous Monitor and Merrimac: they were slow, squat and
ugly-but useful. Eads signed the contract for these boats
with the government before he had the necessary supplies for
their construction. Indeed, the wood required was still in the
forests of Michigan. However, Eads employed several thousand men on this project, financing it himself. Some of his
fourteen boats were committed to battle while Eads still held
title to them.2 '
After the war, Eads returned to the River and the terrain
he knew best. Through fortuity, Eads prospered when a riverfront fire in St. Louis sent many steamboats anchored at the
city's wharves to the River bottom. From 1867 to 1874, Eads
supervised the construction of an enormous steel and masonry
bridge in St. Louis over the Mississippi, now known as the
Eads Bridge. While building the bridge, Eads used the technology he had previously learned in experimenting with diving bells. Large caissons were needed for the bridge's
construction. The caisson structures, shaped like a diving bell
and made of wood and steel, were filled with compressed air
and placed in the river at the site of the bridge's in-stream
piers. Workmen were then lowered into the caissons to dig
out the river bed, lowering the caisson over them until the
workers reached bedrock. The caisson was then filled with
water to serve as the foundation for the two huge stone piers
20. D. McCullough, supra note 10, at 180.
21. The military value of the gun boat project is reviewed in B. CATTON, GRANT
MOVES SOUTH 102-03 (1960) and in H. MILLER & Q. ScoTT, supra note 9, at 74-75.
The best known boat of those built during this project was the eighth one built. It
was the Thomas Benton, named after a Missouri senator who died in 1858. The boat
was 202 feet long, had a nine foot draft, and weighed 1,033 tons. Eads purchased it
from the government in 1855; the government repurchased it in 1861 for $26,850. It
was known as Submarine No. 7 before its name was changed in 1861. This boat participated in the Battle of Vicksburg and was sold at a scrap auction for $3,000 in 1865.
Reiser, New Boats Coming to Riverfront, 5 ST. Louis Bus. J., No. 38, June 17, 1985, at
1C.
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necessary for the bridge. 2
Eads died in 1887, entertaining visions of a huge railway
to carry steamships between oceans and across the 125-mile
wide Central American Isthmus of Tehuantepec. 3
II. EADS V. BRAZEL TON
A.

The Steamboat America

There were many steamboats named America, but only
one of them achieved legal significance. 24 The America was
built and completed in 1827 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and
docked in New Orleans. 25 She was moderately sized, weighing in at 263 tons. In 1827, this sidewheel steamboat was navigating downriver off Plum Point, Tennessee,26 the first turn in
the river around the Tennessee shore. The America snagged
22. For a description of the use of caissons by Eads and also in the construction of
the Brooklyn Bridge, see D. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 10, at 173-189 (1972). Eads
learned of the use of caissons for bridge-building while on vacation in France by watching a French engineer use them in this way. Id. at 183. For an illustration of a caisson
see H. MILLER & Q. SCOTr, supra note 9, at 104.
In 1871, Eads sued Washington A. Roebling, the engineer of the Brooklyn Bridge,
asserting that the latter used Eads' caisson design. Eads, claiming that his caisson was
the first to place the air locks at the bottom rather than at the top, asserted that Roebling had not credited Eads' design. D. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 10 at 344. Thus,
Eads v. Brazelton was not the only result of Eads' prickliness about the use of his technology, even against an opponent who at the time suffered from nervous exhaustion and
breakdown. D. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 10, at 344-46.
Eads often worked on the bridge under adverse conditions. One blazing summer
day in 1873, while attempting to join the two central half-arches that made up the span,
he was forced to pack the closing ribs in ice to shrink the beams elongated by the heat.
Marling, Book Review Desk, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1987, at 44, col. 1 (reviewing D.
SCHODEK, LANDMARKS IN AMERICAN CIVIL ENGINEERING (1987)).
A Board of Army Engineers considered the Eads Bridge an obstruction to navigation and wanted it demolished. Eads went to President Grant, whom he had met during the Civil War. President Grant overruled the recommendation of the Board by
stating that only Congress could decide to demolish the bridge. D. MCCULLOUGH,
supra note 10, at 346-47.
23. D. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 10, at 552. Eads' last words were "I cannot
die-I have not finished my work." Verhovek, Neglect Dulls Glory of a Once Famous
Hall, N.Y. Times, March 21, 1988, at B3, col. 5 (describing the Hall of Fame for Great
Americans, Bronx, New York City).
24. W. LYTLE, MERCHANT STEAM VESSELS OF THE UNITED STATES 1807-1868,
8, 244 (1952). This book, commonly called the "Lytle List," is a directory of steamboats for the years enumerated.
25. Id. at 8.
26. Civil War military maps identify the location as "Plumb Point," perhaps referring to a plumb line needed to mark the depth of the channel at that place. See I WEST
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at this bend and sank near the opposite Arkansas shore on
November 12th of that year. No lives were lost.
The river changed course a few years later. The main
channel shifted, and the sunken boat became a nucleus around
which the channel built a large island covered with maturing
trees. 7 However, what the river creates, it can destroy. By
the mid 1850's, the river resumed its former course, after eroding the entire island and leaving the America in forty feet of
water.28
B. The Facts of the Case
The America was lost "within the limits of Mississippi
county,"29 the northernmost county in Arkansas abutting the
Mississippi River. The plaintiff, Brazelton, learned of the
wreck's location. He proceeded to the site, fastened a buoy to
a weight that rested upon the wreck, and blazed trees on the
shore to help him locate it in the future.30 Despite these preliminary efforts, a combination of bad weather, mechanical
problems and pressing salvage business forced him to cease
salvage operations over the America.31
One month later, in February, 1855, Eads located the
wreck.32 The court's record shows that Eads and his men loPOINT MILITARY ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES, plate 100 (V. Esposito, ed.); 1987
RAND MCNALLY COMM. & MARKETING GUIDES 226 (118th ed.).
27. L. HUNTER, STEAMBOATS ON THE WESTERN RIVERS 228 (1949). These trees

were later cut down and the land used for a cabin and a cornfield.
The Mississippi's continuing hilarious mockery, a running joke, is to change
the whole eastern boundary of Arkansas constantly: thousands of acres of Arkansas soil lie on the eastern shores of the river in what ought to be Tennessee
and Mississippi, while thousands of acres of Tennessee and Mississippi lie on
the western shore in what ought to be Arkansas.
D. HARINGTON, LET US BUILD US A CITY 258 (1986).

The hydraulics on the River so fascinated James Eads that he was to eventually
turn his attention to the improvement of navigation on the River. See E. MCHENRY,
ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF JAMES B. EADS 496-97 (1884) (describing Eads' own ac-

count of the search for the America).
28. L. HUNTER, supra note 27, at 228. Later Eads shaped his observations while
delving into a theorem of hydraulic scour, theorizing that the sediment carrying capacity of the River depended on the rate of its flow. H. MILLER & Q. Scorr, supra note 9,
at 72.
29. Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499, 502 (1861).
30. Id. at 502.
31. Id. at 502-04.
32. Id. at 506.
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cated the America independently of the plaintiff's earlier effort. In fact, "Captain" Eads was shown to have learned of the
wreck's location as early as 1843, from the captain of the
America, and others who travelled on or lived along the river
when the America was lost. 33 The court stated: "Neither the
sinking of the America nor its locality seems to have so obscurely remembered as the [plaintiff's] bill supposes. ' 34 The
existence of these independent grounds for determining the location of the America is vital when characterizing the defendant's salvage efforts as not usurping the fruits of the plaintiff's
efforts. The defendants were thus able to place Submarine No.
4 over the wreck and raise the remaining cargo which included lead worth $4,507.96 and even the boilers from the
wreck.35
The plaintiffs sued for an injunction to protect their work
in progress against further interference by the defendants.3 6
This suit was brought in equity as the plaintiffs were uncertain
about their legal right to possession of the cargo and the
wreck. The trial court granted the injunction. Although the
defendants initially pulled their boat away from the wreck
site, they returned so close to the plaintiff's salvage operation
as to endanger and hinder it. The plaintiff again sought to
enforce the restraining order of the court.3 7 Eads and his
crew were held in contempt of court and fined one thousand
dollars. As the fine was compensatory, it was paid to the
plaintiff. The defendants appealed.3 s
33. Id. at 505-06 (An employee of Eads, Captain Turner, found the wreck and
claimed he did so "without the assistance of Brazelton's marks."). The salvage operation was commenced on September 28th, 1855 and the Submarine No. 4 completed the
task. Id. at 504. See H. MILLER & Q. SCOTT, supra note 9, at 70 for an 1858 illustration of Eads & Nelson's Submarine No. 7.
34. Eads, 22 Ark. at 505.
35. Id. at 502. For Eads' own recounting of the search, see E. McHENRY, ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF JAMES B. EADS 496-97 (1884).
36. Eads, 22 Ark. at 501.
37. Id. at 502-03. If this suit were brought today, it would be pleaded either under
the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, or in state court under the law of finders.
However, in the 1850s, the United States Supreme Court had just completed the extention of admiralty jurisdiction to major inland waterways. See, e.g., The Magnolia, 61
U.S. 296 (1858); see generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, ADMIRALTY (2d ed. 1975) 3132, n.99 (describing the opinion during the 1850s and 1860s as "bringing it [this extension of jurisdiction] home to the bar ... .
38. Id. at 503.
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The Opinion

The Arkansas Supreme Court essentially dealt with three
distinct issues: first, whether Brazelton's "finding" of the
wreck constituted "possession" under the law; second,
whether the property in the wreck had been abandoned; and
third, whether Eads could be held in contempt of court even
though he was successful on appeal. To fully understand the
current usefulness of the Eads decision it is essential to address the court's treatment of these issues as well as any public
policy concerns that may have influenced the court.
1. The Finding and Possession Issue
The Supreme Court of Arkansas declared that the principal ground of controversy was "Brazelton's right of occupancy of the wreck by finding, and... that may depend upon
its possession ....,3 This statement of the issue emphasizes

the difference between finding a thing and taking possession of
it. The act of finding does not by itself confer a legal right to
that which is found. Gaining a legal right depends upon what
happens thereafter.
The court found that Brazelton's marking the wreck's location with buoys and blazed trees was insufficient to establish
possession of the wreck. His complaint was therefore insufficient to show either that he was in the process of taking possession or actually in possession of the cargo. Instead, when
Brazelton pulled his boat off of the site, the process of taking
possession remained incomplete, 40 leaving the wreck available
for capture by the defendants. The court did not state that
Brazelton had to capture the cargo or the wreck before obtaining a legal right to possession. The opinion recognizes
that the custom of the River regards placement of one's boat
over a wreck as according the salvor a right to complete the
salvage operation free of interference. 4 ' Possession requires a
possessory act plus intent to reduce a thing to possession.
39. Id. at 503.
40. Id. at 510-12.
41. Id. at 511-12. By way of analogy, one can compare the Eads opinion on this
point to the dissent by Judge Livingston in Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805)
(Livingston, J., dissenting) or to the custom of the fisherman in Young v. Hichens, 115
Eng. Rep. 228 (Q.B. 1844).
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Brazelton showed his intent, but not the act. The lower
court's judgment was reversed in favor of the defendants on
the possession issue.42
The Eads court stated that an act of possession need not
be manual.43 The court explained that "[p]lacing his boat
over the wreck, with the means to raise its valuables and with
persistent efforts directed to raising the lead ... would have
been such acts of possession as the law would notice and protect." 44 The court does not explain this statement, but these
hypothetical acts might have sufficed on two separate
grounds. First, salvage efforts would have given notice to interlopers, such as the defendants. Second, the efforts would
have conformed to existing salvage customs, signalling Brazelton's claim to other salvors and averting interference. Because Lads, unlike Pierson, involved competitors on the same
stretch of the River, the local salvage custom provided a rule
which the court might have enforced. But would a court be
justified in fashioning a rule of law from the "custom of salvors?" Such customs can change with time, perhaps faster
than the law ought to change. Today, an Eads type of case
might be submitted to arbitration. Judicial economy might
encourage this practice, but arbitration was unavailable when
Eads was tried in 1861.
2.

The Abandonment Issue--Third-Party Rights

Captain Eads and the defendants made at least one unsuccessful argument while gaining reversal of the trial court's
42. Id. at 516. See also, Foulke v. New York Consol. R.R. Co., 228 N.Y. 269, 270,
127 N.E. 237, 238 (1920) (citing Eads) ("Abandoned property is owned by him who
takes it into his ownership.").
43. Eads, 22 Ark. at 511.
44. Id. at 512. This idea of constructive possession was used in Treasure Salvors,
Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 546 F. Supp. 919, 926
(S.D. Fla. 1981). The case of MDM Salvage, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 631 F. Supp. 308, 311 (S.D. Fla. 1986), however, distinguished the
law of salvage from the law of finders. Salvage is concerned with removal of lost property from waterways, but not with the right or title to the property. The salvor holds
the property for the purpose of saving it from destruction and retaining it until paid for
his efforts. In contrast, finders acquire a right in the property. However, in the situation of abandoned property, where the first finder acquires the right of the abandoning
owner, the law of salvage and finders merges to give the first finder of the salvaged
property sole possession. MDM Salvage, 631 F. Supp. at 311-12. See infra notes 107109 and accompanying text.
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decree-that the title to the wreck and the cargo was not held
by the plaintiff.4 5 The court rejected this argument by finding
that the wreck had been abandoned.46 The evidence showed
that in the first two years after the sinking, the owners removed the specie, furs, and a small amount of lead from the
wreck and "contented themselves therewith.

' 47

The last

phrase seems to be mere supposition. It is difficult to tell what
a person intends by what he does not do, or, for that matter,
what he fails to "do next."4 Also, local residents removed
one hundred and sixteen lead ingots.4 9 The owners' inaction
in the face of this looting is better evidence of the original
owners' abandonment and allows the court to jump to its next
conclusion of law-that the right to such abandoned property
belongs to its next possessor. At any rate, due to the decline of
the lead mines in the Upper Mississippi,5" an assumption that
the miners and smelters were no longer interested in reclaiming the cargo seems reasonable, supporting the inference
of abandonment.
The defendants were not permitted to show that the title
45. Eads, 22 Ark. at 507-08.
46. Id. at 508-09. The section of the opinion most often cited in later cases is the
section that states the rule that personal property may be abandoned. See, e.g., Wilmore Coal Co. v. Brown, 147 F. 931, 943 (C.C.W.P.Pa. 1906) (construing a coal deed,
the court stated that abandonment "is the voluntary forsaking or throwing away of
property, leaving it open to be appropriated by the first comer"); Collins v. Lewis, 149
A. 668, 669 (Conn. 1930) (abandonment requires an intent to abandon as well as physical abandonment); McCabe v. Baltimore Trust Co., 180 A. 780, 781 (Del. Super. Ct.
1935) (holding that a legal or equitable owner of personal property may relinquish all
rights to the property by intentional abandonment); Coulombe v. Gross, 148 A. 582,
583 (N.H. 1930) (recognizing that distinct from real property, "any act intended as a
discovership and in full relinquishment of personal property amounts to a loss of actor's
interest in it ....
); Foulke v. New York Consol. R.R. Co., 228 N.Y. 269, 127 N.E.
237, 238 (1920) (a findings case, in which the court held that personal property found in
a railroad car cannot be presumed to have been abandoned).
In the context of admiralty law, the rule of abandonment was cited in State v.
Flying "W" Enterprises, 273 N.C. 399, 160 S.E.2d 482, 488 (1968) ("It is well-settled
law that the owner of sunken or derelict vessels or their contents may abandon them so
effectively as to divest title and ownership.").
47. Eads, 22 Ark. at 508.
48. The law would not, with the same ease, indulge in a presumption of abandonment when the subject of the litigation is real, and not personal, property. For example,
in Texas, abandonment of a title to real property is not recognized. See, e.g., Rogers v.
Ricane, 772 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. 1989).
49. Eads, 22 Ark. at 508.
50. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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to the property belonged to third parties not before the court.
The court's concern is the relative rights of the litigants before
it. A wide-ranging inquiry into the title of one other than a
litigant is beyond the court's jurisdiction and probably its
competence as well. 5
The Contempt of Court Issue
There are two types of contempt: criminal and civil. Further, civil contempt can be labeled as either coercive or compensatory.5 2 The latter was involved in this case. A
compensatory civil fine in the amount of one thousand dollars
was awarded to Brazelton. This amount is substantial, considering that in the pleading, the cargo was valued at
$4507.96. It is difficult to discern what the fine was intended
to compensate without considering how the amount of the fine
was determined and whether the defendants intended to cause
the complainant's loss of the possession. 53 Once the court decided that Brazelton had no possessory right in the cargo,
these questions became moot. There can be no interference if
there is no legal right on which to impinge.
The court believed that the civil contempt issue was severable, and that had it been considered separately, the fine
against the defendant might have been permitted to stand. As
it was, the defendants recovered the fine from the plaintiffs.
This is an example of disobeying a court order in the course of
asserting an as-yet-unrecognized legal right. The protection
of the judicial process from such flaunting abuse might be an
issue separated from all others involved in the litigation.54
3.

51. Id at 509.
52. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947):
Judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may, in a proper case, be employed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court's order, and to compensate the complainant for losses
sustained. Where compensation is intended, a fine is imposed, payable to the
complainant. Such fine must of course be based upon evidence of the complainant's actual loss.
For a current statement of the law, see Columbus-American Deep Search, Inc. v.
The Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, Her Engines, etc., Located
Within a Circle Having a Radius of 50 Miles, Whose Center Point is at Coordinates 31
52' North Latitude and 76 21' West Longitude, 1988 Am. Marit. Cases 2957, 2961
(1988) (discussed infra at notes 114-35 and accompanying text).
53.

See generally D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 98-104 (1973).

54.

Eads, 22 Ark. at 516.
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Severing the issue of the fine for contempt of court could
have been the trial court's recognition that even had the plaintiff not yet gained a right of possession in the wreck, he retained a right to pursue his operation free of interference.
This point is interesting: At the time of the decision, a civil
fine as a remedy for contempt of court was just being recognized as a civil matter when the complainant suffers a loss. 55
The court said, however, that a decree should be entered
for the recovery of the amount of the fine given to Brazelton
to compensate for his being "obstructed by the defendants in
his work upon the wreck after the service of the injunction
upon the defendants .... "56 The opinion expresses willingness
to let the fine stand if it was intended to punish "the two defendants' [Eads' employees] disobedience to the process of the
court.. ."57 Then the opinion states "a different decree would
have been called for upon this branch of the case." 58 That the
Arkansas Supreme Court was favorably disposed to levying
the fine was further illustrated by the award to the plaintiff of
trial court costs.59 This result is questionable today.6° Why
couldn't the portion of Brazelton's petition requesting the
award of the fine be styled as one for damages for interference
with Brazelton's right to conduct operations rather than as a
possessory right in the wreck or its cargo? So styled, the fine
could have been what the petition requested. Severance of the
55. For example, the basic federal contempt statute, 18 U.S.C. § 401, was enacted
in 1831 in reaction to the abuse by a federal judge in St. Louis of punishing journalists
who wrote critical stories of him. D. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 683
(1985). Although codified to limit the criminal contempt power of the courts, the statute is nevertheless interpreted as circumscribing both the civil and the criminal contempt power. Id. at 683-84.
56. Eads, 22 Ark. at 516. Whether an equity court could order consequential
damages after the violation of an injunction was in dispute by the turn of the century.
See, e.g., W.A. & H.A. Root v. McDonald, 260 Mass. 344, 157 N.E. 684 (1927) (permitting consequential damages, but citing Eads as contrary authority); Campbell v. Justices
of Superior Court, 187 Mass. 509, 73 N.E. 659, 660 (1905) (permitting consequential
damages, but citing authority to the contrary).
57. Eads, 22 Ark. at 516.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. This may have been the correct result, as these were the days of common law
pleading. The complainant was in effect requesting damages, a legal remedy, amid a
complaint styled as an equitable action. Hence, the court might have viewed the pleading as too artful by half: an attempt to avoid the legal requirements necessary to establish possession and yet still recover damages for interference with an equitable right.
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issue raised by the fine would not have been necessary. Eads'
possessory right would then have arisen only by way of an
affirmative defense.
Perhaps the attorneys for the plaintiff mispled this aspect
of the case. The right to lawfully conduct the salvage business
could have been protected by the court, if not with a contempt
of court order, then by a suit in trespass or trespass on the
case. 61 Eads and Brazelton were both based in St. Louis. Perhaps they were fierce competitors for both the information on
wrecks as well as for work at the site of wrecks. In the end,
the court only states that a fine is appropriate to protect the
integrity of the judicial process, even when that process enforces an incorrect version of the law. That characterization
is too neutral for the result which the facts suggest that the
court below meant to reach-taking the sting out of the sharp
competition with which the defendants met the plaintiff's
efforts.62
4.

The Public Policy Concerns

Brazelton eventually removed his boat, and had several
reasons for doing So. 63 Brazelton had mechanical difficulty
with his rig, and used obsolete technology for raising cargoes,
while the defendant had the latest gear. In fact, Eads & Nelson was running a fleet of strong, steam powered salvage
boats, consecutively numbered and each one more advanced
than the last. Eads' operation did not depend on lines slung
from shore to keep the boat positioned over the wreck. As the
court observed, "If Brazelton's boat had been accompanied
with steam power as was the Submarine, No. 4, the rise of the
water in June, or the season of floating boats and rafts, would
not have been uncontrollable obstructions to his desire to save
61.

Trespass on the case deals with the consequences of a trespass, rather than the

trespass itself. T. PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 372-73 (5th

ed. 1956).
62. It is difficult to determine whether the technological advantage enjoyed by the
defendants also gave the diver from Eads' boat the ability to move laterally on the river
bottom, out from under Submarine No. 4 and under Brazelton's boat, to seize the cargo.
Such a possibility is suggested by Eads' early use of the diving bell. See supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
63. Eads, 22 Ark. at 502.
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the lead of the America .... "64
By awarding judgment to Eads, the appellate court protected the most efficient salvor whereas the trial court attempted to protect the least efficient one. This is the sort of
efficiency which the rule of Pierson was meant to promote.
Yet efficiency is not the decisive factor of this opinion. Brazelton removed his boat from the wreck site not only because of
mechanical failure but also because of other pressing business.
Efficiency aside, the court also might have chosen to protect
the first salvor to complete the salvage operations, regardless
of the efficiency of the successful operation. Speedy removal
of the wrecks from the main channel of the Mississippi served
an important public interest in safe navigation. Despite the
claims of steamboat owners and pilots that their boats could
float in a heavy dew, the riverbed wreckage pointed to the
contrary. 65 The court might have determined that the question before it was this: do we want to encourage people to
begin searching for wrecks, or do we want to encourage them
to take possession and remove them? In the court's view, the
latter best served the interests of commerce.
The opinion was issued during the January term, 1861, of
the Arkansas Supreme Court. The onset of the Civil War was
imminent. Between December 20, 1860, and January 26,
1861, the tier of states between South Carolina and Louisiana
seceded. Arkansas followed the Deep South out of the Union
on May 8, 1861, along with the Confederacy's border states. 66
Because of the war, lead would soon rise in value. So awarding judgment to James Eads, a strong Unionist from a state
which would not secede, was an act of judicial statesmanship.
The court hewed the opinion to the facts established in the
pre-War era.
The Court's Research and Use of Authority
The court's research was thorough, and included the review of many civil law authorities. 67 Roman law, as stated by
an annotator of Justinian's Code, is cited: "Found means not
D.

64.

Id. at 504.

65.
66.
67.

See W. HAVINGHURST, supra note 5, at 178.
G.B. TINDALL, supra note 5, at 649.
Eads, 22 Ark. at 510-12.
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merely discovered, but taken up."6 A civil law treatise writer
stated that "[W]ithout the intention there is no possession....
Without the detention, the intention is useless, and does not
make the possession."69 Admiralty and Louisiana law were
also reviewed to support the general rule that possession requires both an intent to possess and possession itself. Citing
the civil law of Louisiana makes sense for another reason:
New Orleans was the home port of the America: Using its law
removed the temptation of the losing litigant to apply a confficts of law rule to reverse the unfavorable decision.
The court's use of authority, however, was tentative. After stating that "the following adjudged cases may have a
bearing upon this case,"" the opinion reviewed four cases
dealing with hunter's rights and bee-hives.
1. The "Hunting" Cases
Eads cites a pair of hunting cases to support one facet of
the decision. Relying on Pierson v. Post 7 ' and Buster v.
Newkirk, 72 Eads employs the rule of capture to justify a finding that the lead was not possessed until it was actually captured. Whether such borrowed application is appropriate is
suspect.
a.

Pierson v. Post

Eads first cited Pierson v. Post.73 The plaintiff was pursuing a fox on a "wild and uninhabited" beach when the defendant killed it. Although the beach was state land, the state
asserted no interest in its resident wildlife. The defendant was
not liable for killing the fox because the plaintiff had evidenced no claim by occupancy.74 Thus, the public locale of
the case appears to be unimportant to the court.
Eads occurred within the main channel of a navigable
waterway, an important public space. The state had an inter68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 510.
Id.
Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805).
20 Johns. 75 (N.Y. 1822).
Eads, 22 Ark. at 512 (citing Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 75).
Id.
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est in clearing wrecks from the channel. As such, it is clear
that the contexts of Eads and Pierson distinguish the cases
from a policy perspective. The controversy in Pierson between
two private hunters is less imbued with a public interest than
the controversy in Eads, where concern for waterway commerce is distinct.
This characterization of Eads obscures the fact that the
litigants in both cases were competitors. The hunters in Pierson were competing, but not on a regular basis. In Eads, however, the parties clearly vied for a livelihood on a regular basis
in attempting to harvest a limited resource-the wrecks in the
Mississippi. Perhaps commercial motives were more clearly
separated from personal ones by the time of Eads than was
possible when Pierson was decided. This may explain the
Eads court's tolerance of the bullying use of Eads' more efficient boat than some interpretations of the facts warrant.
Nevertheless, the question underlying Pierson's applicability
as authority is whether, as in Eads, the court should apply law
made for private, non-commercial parties to disputes between
commercial parties. Why does the law usually distinguish between these two types of parties? It is possible that the distinction protects investment, labor, and effort, and regulates
competition. Additionally, the distinction might be made to
add flexibility and fact-specificity into the law. The relative
expertise and investment of the parties, as well as the regularity of their competition, should differentiate the cases.
Thus, Eads illustrates the rule of capture formulated in
Pierson, but applies it to resolve a commercial dispute. Several points can be made. First, the citation of Pierson is perhaps an illustration of the judicial urge to follow a single rule
for all types of litigants. That a case involves two hunters or
two commercial salvors should not matter if the parties in
each dispute have the same status inter se.
A second point is that the facts of the case show one result of the rule of capture. After Pierson, one might expect
that each hunter would hunt more furiously by either modifying their hunting practices-honing marksmanship, shooting
at random, more wildly, or more frequently, in the hope of
hitting the game--or investing in better hunting equipment
such as a better gun or a faster horse. In the commercial case,
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the litigants will already have modified their practices until
they are of professional quality. Thus, if the rule of capture is
to control their actions, they will have to invest more heavily
in the technology of their trade. The heavy investor captures
the prize! This is surely one lesson of Eads. A corollary is
that outdated technology and low investment loses. However,
talk of technology blurs the human facts of Eads. The defendant's boat was able to hold its position in the current, close to
the wreck, but also close to the plaintiff's boat.7" Because the
plaintiff's boat was the lesser advanced, it eventually had to
back off. The newer technology interfered with the old, in the
sense that it perhaps allowed the defendants to bully the plaintiffs into abandoning salvage operations over the wreck.
The opinion makes this point in a slightly different way.
The court explains that the plaintiff did not resume work on
the wreck because "the sinking of the steamboat Eliza offered
'
Thereafter, the plaintiff
the opportunity of other work."76
would have applied himself to the America, but the periodical rise of the river at that season prevented him from
doing so, and when he was nearly ready, with his boat and
machinery in order for effective labor, with favorable
water for work, safe from rafts and flat and coal boats, the
Submarine, No. 4, belonging to the defendants, passed
him . . .and, within two days, was placed over the
wreck.77
In other words, Submarine No. 4 won the race to the wreck.
The faster boat, like the hunter with the faster horse or better
gun, got the judgment.
As previously discussed, the trial court issued a civil con75. Eads, 22 Ark. at 502-03, 507, 512.
76. Id. at 504.
77. Id. These statements are made after the main summary of the facts and are
often missed. Indeed, only one case subsequently citing and relying upon Eads makes
much of this "race to the wreck." In Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked
and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 572 (5th Cir. 1981), the court stated:
Brazelton was, however, first, distracted from this task by another salvage operation and then, disabled from the undertaking by a rise in the river which
made it impossible for his salvage vessel to pursue the project. In the fall of
1855, Brazelton again headed toward the site of the sunken barge. On the
way, however, he was passed up by a swifter vessel belonging to Eads.
In Treasure Salvors, the petitioner sought an injunction prohibiting rival salvors from
conducting operations within 2,500 yards on either side of a Spanish galleon wreck site.
Id. at 563.
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tempt fine of $1,000 against the defendants for obstructing the
plaintiff's work.78 The Arkansas Supreme Court ordered that
this money be repaid to the defendants. This order may have
been a reward for the plaintiff's initial heavy investment, but
it also can be seen as tacit endorsement of sharp practice. Ferreting out sharp practice is a job for which an appellate court
is ill-suited and is better left to the trial judge. But the trial
judge did not make clear what he was trying to accomplish
with the fine, so its imposition was quashed. As exemplified
by these facts, there is a thin line between. malicious interference with a competitor and the mere use of a technological
advantage.79
Eads thus plays out the consequences of the rule of capture formulated in Pierson. In so doing, it prompts one to
question the extent to which courts should interfere in commercial endeavors. Favoring obsolete technology is not an
American pastime. 80 The result of Eads supports legal rules
that encourage capital investment rather than individual initiative unsupported by such backing. As there is not much
known about the investments and capital of Eads' competitors, the contrast between their innovation and technology is
not conclusively shown. However, it is apparent that James
Eads was interested in putting capital to work on his inventions or at least presented himself to the court in this light.
The rule of capture formulated in Pierson was there applied to settle a dispute between two hunters equally equipped.
In Eads, the opinion supports the supposition that the court
did not believe both ventures to be so situated. Why does the
court apply a rule meant to settle a question of use, occupancy, and possession in such a way as to favor and reward
the accumulation of investment capital in Eads' inventions?
Perhaps the court was attempting to disarm its critics by pretending ignorance of the effects of its decision. The more
probable answer is that the writer of the opinion did not recognize the distinction. The concept of protecting capital was
78.

Eads, 22 Ark. at 502.

79. The easier case would involve the interference of one neighbor with another.
See Keeble v. Heckeringill, 11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1809).

80.

Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American Law,

40 U. CM.L. REV. 248, 249-50 (1973).
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new; the shift from protecting use to protecting capital was
too gradual to notice. The shift from protecting the hardworking inventor to protecting his financial backers is present
but gradual in Eads.
If the court could hold conflicting purposes for the rule of
capture, why can't we today as well? Our capacity for doing
so is at stake when we try to understand Eads. The case
marks a significant shift from Pierson, applying a rule of capture formulated for possessors to protect capital investments.
b.

Buster v. Newkirk

In Buster v. Newkirk,"' the plaintiff hunter wounded and
subsequently pursued a deer. The hunter gave up the chase at
nightfall but his dogs continued. When the plaintiff resumed
pursuit, he came to the door of the defendant's house where
the deer had been killed the previous night. The defendant
alleged that the deer was shot by an unknown party just
before the defendant killed it, and that he subsequently cut its
throat just as the plaintiff's dog attacked. In a trover action,
the trial court awarded the plaintiff seventy five cents, the
value of the skin.82
The judgment was reversed in favor of the defendant.
Although the plaintiff's relinquishment of the chase for the
night implied abandonment, this result seems harsh. The continuous use of the dogs negates an intent to abandon the
chase. In any event, the defendant's killing might more easily
have ended the chase due to the plaintiff's running the deer
into the ground. This case again highlights the thin line between a tort rule against interference and a property rule of
capture.
Newkirk relies exclusively on Pierson. That the plaintiff
did not deprive the deer of "its natural liberty" 8 3 before the
defendant seized it was dispositive with the court. The
Newkirk opinion becomes an unpleasantly close hunting case
and on that account, even less useful for the Eads court than
Pierson. Newkirk as a precedent helps the Eads court disre81. 20 Johns. 75 (N.Y.1822).
82. Id. The slight value of the judgment is perhaps testimony to the defendant's
honesty.
83. Id.
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gard any sympathy its members might have felt for the outmaneuvered salvage plaintiffs.
2.

The "Bee-Hive" Cases

The next precedents involve the keeping of bees. Citing
Gillet v. Mason,84 the Eads court states that "[m]arking a beetree.., was not sufficient to vest a right in the finder."8' 5 The
finder must have possession of the hive to have a right to the
honey. Ferguson v. Miller 86 further braced the Eads court's
conclusions, as that case asserted that cutting down the tree
that supports the bee-hive is likewise insufficient to establish
possession. 87
a.

Gillet v. Mason

Gillet, decided in 1810, was a trespass action for cutting 88a
tree with a bee-hive and carrying away the hive and honey.
The honey was worth ten dollars. The tree was blazed by the
plaintiff (Gillet), who was the son of the deceased landowner
on whose land the tree was located. Plaintiff's blazing the tree
was insufficient to establish a right to the hive or the honey.
The court stated that
[m]arking the tree did not reclaim the bees, nor vest an
exclusive right of property in the finder, especially in this
case, against the plaintiff in error, who, as one of the children of Timothy Gillet, must be considered as one of the
heirs, and, as such, a tenant in common in the land.89
The presence of other title holders to the land was important to the outcome of the case. Blazing the tree was insufficient to extinguish the claim of the co-tenants of the plaintiff
and was likewise insufficient against the defendant. In dicta,
the court stated that seizing the hive is the minimum that
would be necessary to assert a right to the hive and to the
honey. 9°
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

7 Johns. 15 (N.Y. 1810).
Eads, 22 Ark. at 512.
1 Cow. 243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823).
Eads, 22 Ark. at 512.
Gillet, 16 Johns. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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Ferguson v. Miller

Ferguson, decided thirteen years after Gillet, was also a
trespass case.9 ' The plaintiff claimed a license to cut down a
bee-tree on another's land. The plaintiff marked the tree with
his initials but did not cut it down. The defendant meanwhile
paid the landowner fifty cents for the same license, substituted
his own mark for that of the plaintiff, felled the tree and carred off the hive. 92 The court based its decision on the rules of
capture and license.
The plaintiff's license lacked consideration, rendering the
license revokable. Construing the license as a right to cut the
tree and reduce the hive to possession, the court reasoned that
the landowner retained the right to capture the hive himself
and concomitantly the right to assign his right of capture,
which he eventually did assign to the defendant. This second
license "may have been a revocation of the former license.
But suppose it was not, then the two parties stood on an equal
footing; and he who first reduced them (the bees) to possession
became the owner." 93 Thus, in Ferguson, the rule of capture is
used to fill gaps in the record about the licenses. The rule of
prior possession is an afterthought and clearly dicta, as the
conveyancing rules of the common law disposed of the case.
Both Gillet and Ferguson regard the right of the landowner as crucial to the opinion. To that extent, the cases lack
potency when used as authority for deciding Eads. In both
cases, as in Eads, the rule capture is used defensively. The
rights of the landowner is not a right to prevail in trespass
against the possessor of the hive. In a sense, the landowners
do not obtain constructive "possession" of the hive, permitting exlusion of others from the hives, by merely holding title
to the property upon which the hive is located. Neither landowner shows possession of the land as a repository for the
hives, nor that he needs all of the honey to sustain some special processing technique. Absent such a showing, mere title
is insufficient grounds for obtaining a trespass judgment. Ac91.

Ferguson, 1 Cow. at 243.

92.
93.

Id. at 244.
Id.
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tual possession or use of the hive is encouraged; its user is
preferred over the holder of the passive title asset.
The Eads case is crafted from divergent legal concepts,
including the rule of capture, interference with business operations, land owner's rights and licenses, and even public policy.
In a similar manner, Eads is applied to resolve varied disputes. The breadth of the concepts discussed in Eads allows
this adaptable use. Granting this, however, it is still possible
to distill applications of Eads into a few categories.

III.

CITATIONS TO EADS

The most frequent citations to Eads have been for its rule
regarding the abandonment of personal property rather than
the rule establishing possession 9 4 or the rule of capture that
might be characterized as an unseemly race to the chattel.
This focus on the rule of abandonement is understandable if
Eads is recognized as arising in a relatively unstable, pioneer
society. Litigation regarding previously unowned chattel diminishes as a society stabilizes and property ownership disputes are resolved.
There are two elements requisite to the abandonment of
property-intent to abandon and the act of abandonment."
The inaction of a former owner with regard to a chattel, over
a long period of time, satisfies both elements and supports the
inference that the owner intends to abandon the property. 96
Thus, Eads is commonly used to establish the threshold action
required to hold a chattel. This "holding" rule clears title to
the chattel and defeats the possibility that the true owner of
the porperty loses title to the chattel as a result of the later
capture. As such, the holding rule purges an immoral aura
from any subsequent application of the rule of capture.
JA. Bel Lumber Co. v. Stout 9 7 presents a solid example
--94. See supra note 46.
95. J.A. Bel Lumber Co. v. Stout, 134 La. 987, 1004-5, 64 So. 881, 887 (1914).
96. Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less of Italian Marble, 186 F. Supp. 452, 456
(E.D. Va. 1960) (where sunken cargo was untouched for sixty-six years, the court held
that the cargo was presumed abandoned, stating: "In Eads v. Brazelton ....
it is intimated that the lapse of years will enable a salvor in possession to be characterized as a
finder acquiring good title against the owner.").

97.

134 La. 987, 64 So. 881 (1914).
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of the use of Eads to reason that abandoning a chattel clears
its title. Bel Lumber, decided in 1914, involved the recovery
of logs from the riverbed of the Calcasieu and its tributaries.
Floating logs to transport them from a logging site to a saw
mill typically entailed the loss of approximately ten percent of
the logs. 98 They were often branded by either the loggers or
the mill-owner, who might have bought them in mid-drive. 99
The logs rested on the bottom of the bayou where they remained sound for an indefinite period of time," which increased the difficulty of determining how long each log had
been lost. Eventually, the dearth of available prime timber
prompted renewed interest in salvage operations to raise the
sinkers.101 Of the smaller, inferior logs, twenty to thirty percent became sinkers and never reached the mill. The value of
these sinkers
increased as the loggers shifted into secondary
02
operations. ,
The plaintiff's mill bought these logs and employed
workers to raise them. The plaintiff's mill was not well situated for this work, and eventually, the plaintiff and nine other
mill-owners published a notice that warned third parties to
respect the brands on sinkers.'0 3 The efficacy of the brands
diminished, however, and confusion ensued. Some brands
were used by more than one logger, and some logs were sold
in mid-drive after branding.°4 This rendered the brands useless in sorting out the conflicting rights of loggers and millers.
98. Id. at 992, 64 So. at 882. The percentage of logs lost due to sinkage was largely
a function of the particular type of tree cut. One type of tree found in southern forests,
the yellow pitch pine, sinks naturally when first immersed in water due to its high density. Presumably the logger who attempts to float dense timber to a saw mill assumes
the risk of sinkage en route.
99. Id. at 992, 64 So, at 883.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 992, 64 So. at 882:
The consensus of the testimony, however, is to the effect that a sinker was
considered the property of him who raised it from the bed of the stream in
which it had sunk, no matter what brand it bore, and, at some time prior to
1903, as good, available timber was, perhaps, becoming scarcer than it had
been, some of the loggers turned their attention to the raising of those which
had sunk, and equipping themselves with suitable appliance, made a regular
business of it, and the raised sinkers were purchased as commonly and openly
as any other logs.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 991, 64 So. at 883 ("The mere fact that a 'sinker' raised from the bottom
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Constructive possession could not be predicated on the registry of a brand. Moreover, the plaintiff continued to buy sinkers with various brands after the notice was published,10 5
allowing characterization of the plaintiff as a "bad actor."
By "common understanding,"'' 0 6 the court found that the
sinkers were abandoned and thereby vindicated the rights of
secondary recovery in the spoils of the logging industry.
Although this is not as clear a use of custom as in Eads, the
holding was useful as it kept the logging industry in business
for a longer period than otherwise would have been possible.
A similar value might be assigned to the lead cargo involved
in Eads, raised ten years after the year of peak production of
Galena lead, and probably more valuable on that account.
Eads is most recently cited for its concept of constructive
possession in the context of litigation between the conflicting
rights of salvors. In MDM Salvage v. Unidentified, Wrecked
& Abandoned Sailing Vessel,10 7 the court refused to grant exclusive salvage rights to the wreckage of a Spanish galleon
that had been driven over a mile-long shoal during a hurricane
in 1733. The shoal dismembered the galleon as the boat
scraped across it leaving objects strewn along a long swath of
the sea bed. 08 One can easily imagine a different result in
Eads had the lead been similarly scattered along the riverbed.
Two salvors competed for the wreckage spoils. The court
found that neither salvor spent sufficient time, invested sufficient capital, or formulated an archeological plan for the site.
While the case is factually distinguishable from Eads, the
court nevertheless cites it for its principal rule by stating,
"[t]he law of finds... dictates that the finder of abandoned
property must continuously possess or be in the process of reof a stream, bears the brand of a logger falls considerably short of proving that it belongs to him, or belonged to him when it sank.").
105. Id. at 993, 64 So. at 884.
106. Id. at 1003, 64 So. at 887 (finding that the plaintiff made "no effort, and takes
no action, looking to the recovery of his property, and particularly where he, himself,
acts upon, and profits by, a common understanding to the effect that property such as is
here in question is to be regarded as abandoned.").
107. 631 F. Supp. 308, 309 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
108. Id. at 310.
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ducing to possession the property which he has found."' 9
In addition to the factual dissimilarity between the two
cases, the court's citation to Eads in MDM Salvage is misplaced for another reason as well. Given the close competition for the cargo in Eads, MDM Salvage presents a version of
the Eads rule of capture equally useful to either side in the
Eads litigation. Further, as the rule of capture is a result-oriented rule, the reference in MDM Salvage to the time spent in
raising the cargo is inappropriate. The relevant factor is the
resulting possession, not the time spent achieving it.
MDM Salvage suggests that "sufficient capital investment" can be protected, even though this protection is a step
removed from the rule's function in Eads, which was to protect an inventor's investment in his invention. This function
was in turn an extension of protecting the individual effort of
the successful hunter in Pierson. There is an indication that
the backers of the various salvors in the Florida Keys seizure
case are drawn from other occupations in the way the owner
of a successful business is drawn to owning a professional
sports team. A capital-intensive hobby business gets the
sportsman's version of the Pierson rule applied to it.
Lastly, the case ambiguously refers to an "archeological
plan." This may be a reference to a possessor's intent to possess, or it may refer to a state or federally imposed precondition to raising a treasure found in public waters.
Chance v. CertainArtifacts Found and Salvagedfrom the
Nashville 0 employs Eads to uncouple the salvage and finder
aspects of the case. There, the court found that a steamboat
"embedded" in a state-owned riverbed was in the constructive
possession of the state. The divers, therefore, did not acquire
finders' rights in the boat's artifacts.'
Eads was distinguished as a suit between competing finders rather than between a finder and a landowner, between whom different law
applied." 2 A further distinction could have been made that in
109. Id. at 311. See also Brady v. The Steamship African Queen, 179 F. Supp. 321
(E.D. Va. 1960).
110. 606 F. Supp. 801 (S.D. Ga. 1984).
111. Id. at 807-08 (finding that the plaintiffs' application for a permit to excavate
the wreck "suggests that plaintiffs were aware that the land belonged to the state.").
112. Id. at 804 ("In a suit between competing salvors the first finder to take posses-
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Eads, the steamboat was no longer embedded in the riverbed,
having been released by the changing hydraulics of the
current.
IV.

TWO RECENT CONCEPTS OF POSSESSION
Recent cases citing Eads have been factually and theoretically similar to the original case. State of the art advances in
salvor's technology make this work feasible in deep-sea locations, areas which previously have defied successful salvage efforts. In particular, use of new sonar and remote or television
cameras mounted on radio-controlled submarines allow the
location of deep-sea wrecks, 1 3 and more importantly, in some
cases, possession.
A.

The Central America
A recent case brings a modem perspective to the legal
concepts of Eads. In Columbus-America Discovery Group,
Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel (CentralAmerica),1 1 4 the CentralAmerica was navigating a
course between Panama and New York City. After encountering the fringe of a September hurricane, the ship sailed on
into the center of the storm until a leak disabled its boilers.
Adrift, passengers and crew together attempted to bail the
ship. They failed to keep her afloat, and the CentralAmerica
sank in 1857, one hundred and sixty miles east of Charleston,
S.C.
Many lives were lost, as was a cargo of California gold
being shipped across Panama.' 5 Some passengers survived,
sion of lost or abandoned property with the intention to exercise control over it acquires
title.").
113. See, e.g., Broad, Undersea Robots Open a New Age of Exploration, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 13, 1990, at Cl, col. 4; Hall, Gold Rush of the '90s is under water, USA TODAY,
Nov. 2, 1990, at 2A, col. 1.
114. 742 F. Supp. 1327, 1328 (E.D. Va. 1990). This case is referred to as the Central America litigation because the wreck is believed to be that of the S.S. Central
America. See Columbus-American Discovery Group, Inc. v. The Unidentified,
Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, S.S. CentralAmerica, in rem, 1989 Am. Maritime Cases 1955 (June 30, 1989) (findings of fact,
1). This case is on appeal by the
insurers of the cargo to the Fourth Circuit. Insurers Appeal TreasureRuling, Business
Insur. September 17, 1990, at 2 (reporting that the insurers claim to have paid one and
one half million dollars in claims on the gold in the cargo).

115.

There is so much gold in this cargo that returning it to circulation is likely to
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however, and reached shore to tell of their experiences. 116
Their tales and the fact of the sunken1 treasure
gave the sink17
time.
the
at
notoriety
ing wide-spread
1.

The Plaintiff

The plaintiff's efforts to locate the wreck spanned ten
years and included expenditures of over ten million dollars.
Its methods included the use of "written accounts, oceanographic, meteorological and other data, modem search theory
mathematics, advanced technology and equipment, along with
the services of numerous experts .
*...,8 The technology
implemented in the search was described as "side-scan sonar,
satellite navigation, tele-operated deep-sea equipment (submersible with stereo camera and robotic arms) and computer
modeling software,"' 1 9 on a specially-equipped ship. The
deep-sea equipment operated at ocean depths of a mile and
one half beneath the surface.

2.

The Issue and the Pleadings: What Law Applies?
In claims by parties like those involved in the Central

affect bullion and numismatic markets. Green, Sunken Gold, COINage (January, 1990),
at 9 (reporting that the cargo contains many 1856 and 1857 Double Eagle coins, minted
in San Francisco and bearing the mark of the United States Mint there, as well as many
privately minted coins).
116. Many of the survivors were taken to Norfolk, Virginia, where they had their
hotel bills forgiven by local inn-keepers and were sent on their way with gifts of money
to finance the rest of their trips. Ringle, TreasureHunters' Golden Moment: In Norfolk,
Ceremony for the Salvage Team, Washington Post, October 6, 1989, at Cl, col. 1.
117. Central America, 742 F. Supp at 1329 ("Many of the passengers were gold
miners returning to the East to invest their findings, and others to collect their families
and return to California.").
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1330. Once the vessel was located, the search operation
use[d] a side scan sonar and a deep water tow fish with depressors capable of
providing rapid and reliable information about the sea floor and features...
the use of underwater camera equipment, including real time video, still frame
and ocean data censors [and]... the use of a remotely operated vehicle capable of handling the remains of a vessel and retrieving its contents.
Id. at 1331. This remotely operated vehicle was a submersible, six-ton robot named
Nemo, with mechanical arms capable of picking up a wine glass or a ship's bell. Broad,
supra note 113, at Cl, col. 4. See also Ayres, A Treasurefrom the Seas, but Whose?,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1990, at Al, col. 2 (describing the first gold coins brought to the
surface, during the summer of 1989). The cost of the project is estimated at approximately $10 million. Central America, 742 F. Supp. at 1329.
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America litigation, federal courts state the issue as a choice

between the law of salvage1 20 and the law of finders.

21

The

law of salvage assumes that title to the vessel, the wreck, and
its cargo is held by one person. 22 The salvor claims an award
against the salvaged property and enforces this claim with a

judicial lien. The basis of the lien lies in quasi-contract: the
benefit of salvage, given to the owner, requires recompense in
return. 123 The court will then sell the vessel or cargo and use

proceeds to satisfy the lien. The sale then either clears title to
the property or permits the owner to retain possession.
The law of finds infers that lapse of time and non-use of
the vessel or cargo equals abandonment by the true owner of a

claim to the property. As opposed to the salvor, who must
obtain a lien and then an award, the common law doctrine of
120. See Melikan, Shippers, Salvors, and Sovereigns: Competing Interest in the Medieval Law of Shipwreck, 11 J. LEG. HIST. 163, 175-77 (1990) (reviewing the English
origins of salvage rights and awards).
121. Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found and Salvaged From the Nashville, 606 F.
Supp. 801, 804 (S.D. Ga. 1984). This choice between the two fields of law applies to
waters under federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Maritime Underwater
Surveys, Inc., 403 Mass. 501, 504, 531 N.E.2d 549, 551 (1989) (state court recognizing
federal jurisdiction); Klein v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758
F.2d 1511 (11 th Cir. 1985) (holding that the law of finders is applicable to waters within
the boundaries of a National Monument at Key Biscayne, Florida).
On the other hand, the Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act, MICH. COMP. STAT.
§ 322.701 (1984), has been held to assert one state's jurisdiction over such lands and the
artifacts found there. People v. Massey, 137 Mich. App. 480, 358 N.W.2d 615 (1984).
By the same token, a state can consent to the finder's efforts and validate his or her title
to artifacts of which possession is taken. Chance, 606 F. Supp. at 804-05 (comparing
the law of finders to the law of salvage and applying the former).
Older cases have applied the law of finders to ancient boats, but decided that the
owner of the river bed is the proper owner. See, e.g., Allred v. Biegel, 240 Mo.App. 818,
219 S.W.2d 665 (1949); Elwes v. Briggs Gas Company, 33 Ch.D. 562 (1886). When
found under public or navigable waters, the English courts regarded ancient cargo as
treasure trove-the prerogative of the Crown, a prerogative which American courts
never transferred to the states or the federal government. Maritime Underwater
Surveys, 403 Mass. at 504, 531 N.E.2d at 551 ("The English common law approach to
the law of finds is that title to abandoned property found on the seas is the prerogative
of the Crown.").
122. T. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 500-11 (1987); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, ADMIRALTY, 532-78 (2d ed. 1975). Both treatises provide a general
review of the law of salvage.
123. T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 122, at 509-11 (stressing that the encouragement
of salvage activity and economic efficiency are the twin aims of settling salvage awards);
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 122, at 562-63 (stressing that awards must be
more than quantum meruit and reporting that awards are usually set at about twenty
percent of the wreck and cargo salvaged).
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finds allows
the finder to "acquire title to the salvage
124
property.
The advantage of applying the laws of finds to deep-sea
wrecks is best understood when compared to its alternatives.
Piracy was an interim danger when title was not acquired by a
finder until the cargo of a wreck was brought into port. To
discourage piracy, the law of finds conferred good title upon
possession of the spoils on the high seas. An alternative rule
transfers title to the cargo when a court awards it. The nonsequitur of such a rule is sharply presented in the Central
America case: The rule is policy-neutral but encourages judicial process. It has a self-executing provision, but an antipiracy policy to commend it.
The plaintiffs in the CentralAmerica litigation apparently
gleaned a lesson from Eads: file to protect search efforts from
rival party interference. 25 Unlike Eads, however, the plaintiffs enjoyed the protection of the admiralty jurisdiction of the
federal courts.' 26 The parties asked for a temporary restraining order against their rivals in the original complaint,
and they enlarged the search area to which the order applied.
This freed the plaintiffs from further interference and surveillance from rivals. The remote television pictures taken of the
wreck by the submersible robot provided the basis for the injunction, the enlargement of the area covered by it, and for the
27
civil contempt penalty charges resulting from its violation.
124. Chance, 606 F. Supp. at 804 (describing the law of finders as accepted by
"modern courts," including the doctrine of "animus revertendi"-the owner has no
intention of returning). See also Maritime UnderwaterSurveys, Inc., 403 Mass. at 504,

531 N.E.2d at 551.
125. Central America, 742 F. Supp. at 1331 (discussing the plaintiff's filing). In
Columbus America Discovery Group, Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, S.S. Central America, in Rem, 1989 Am. Marit. Cases 1955, 1956 (1989),
the court stated:
Effective possession of an object is attained in this unique environment by:
(1) locating the object searched; (2) real time imaging of the object; (3) placement or capability to place teleoperated or robotic manipulators on or near the
object, capable of manipulating it as directed by human beings exercising control from the surface; and (4) present intent to control (including deliberately
not disturbing the location of the object, called "telepresence"
or

"telepossession".
See infra note 128 (discussing the press treatment of this concept).
126. The federal admiralty jurisdiction is in rem against the cargo of the Central
America and in personam against potential rivals.
127. CentralAmerica, 742 F. Supp. at 1331-32.
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The right to work the site of the wreck free of competitors was
granted on the basis of what the press happily dubbed "telepresence" 24-the presence of a remote, unmanned vehicle.
This is as close as the court can come to creating a new legal
basis for establishing possession without actually doing so.
Thus, unlike Eads, no issue of unreasonable interference was
present; the plaintiffs preempted the issue on which Brazelton
garnered the sympathy of the Arkansas court over a hundred
years earlier. These plaintiffs appear to have been well-advised as well as well-funded.
Use of federal admiralty jurisdiction has another advantage. It permits the plaintiffs to plead, in the alternative, for
the benefit of both the law of salvage and the law oflfinders,
permitting the plaintiffs to assert title to the wreck and its
cargo under finders' law, and falling back on a salvage award
should this attempt fail. 129 This permits the law of finders to
compliment the law of salvage, rather than usurp it.
A salvor's entitlement to an award usually arises by contract with the wreck's owner. A Lloyds of London contract is
"the most widely used salvage contract in the world. Usually,
a fixed price is not stated on the contract, and the parties rely
upon an elaborate arbitration procedure to determine the
amount which is owing." 130 If the salvor is without a
contract,
the salvor has the right to search and explore navigable
waters for salvageable sites. Upon "finding" a site which
128. See, e.g., Ringle, The Law of Finders-Keepers: Court Grants Deep-Sea Salvors
Rights to Treasure,Washington Post, Aug. 15, 1990, at Cl, col. 1 ("treasure salvors in
the deep sea may claim possession of a wreck by bringing back the first television pictures of it"). One attorney for the finders claimed that this doctrine might someday be
useful in outer space, evoking legal images of planets claimed on the basis of interplanetary fly-bys. Id.
129. Such an election has long been recognized in admiralty courts, where litigants
may choose between admiralty or common law remedies. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333
(1989) (incorporating the language of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 76-77 which
saves "to suitors, in all [admiralty] cases, the right of common law remedy where the
common law is competent to give it"). See generally T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 122,
at 512-13.
130. Sea Lift v. Refinadora Costarricense De Petroleo, 601 F. Supp. 457, 460 (S.D.
Fla. 1984) (enforcing a fixed price salvage contract, but noting that it is not the custom
of the industry). See also Black Gold Marine, Inc. v. Jackson Marine Company, 759
F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1985) (setting aside written salvage contract procured by
misrepresentation).
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is not being actively and successfully worked by another
salvor, he may undertake to rescue the imperiled cargo
and bring it before the Admiralty
Court for a determina131
tion of the salvage award.
A salvage claim has three elements: (1) that a marine peril
exists, (2) that the salvor's service was rendered voluntarily,
and (3) that the salvor's effort was successful in whole or
32
part.
Use of the temporary restraining order available under
the law of salvage aids in the early establishment of a right to
pursue possession of the sunken cargo under the law of finders. 133 The order does not traditionally come without penalty.
A bond must be posted to cover damages if the order injures
other parties to the litigation. 34 The finder or salvor is entitled to court protection to continue working a wreck providing that complete and continuous possession is exercised and
reasonable success in saving the valuables from peril is
demonstrated. 35 The right to continue working the wreck
ripens into a right to exclude other salvors, and thereby expands the possession requirement. Stated simply, a right to
work the site becomes a right to sole possession. The investment, the effort, and the continuous work take an equitable
right to an injunction and ripen it into a possessory right. The
doctrines of salvage and finds merge. The commercial character of the investment seems dispositive in this loosening or ex131. Cobb Coin Co. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549
F. Supp. 540, 556 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that marine peril exists even though the
location of the wreck is known, for purposes of a salvage claim).
132. Id. at 557. See also Klein v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511, 1514-15 (11th Cir. 1985).
133. Authority exists in the maritime salvage context to extend the common law
doctrine of the "law of finds" by declaring that "the finder of abandoned property must
continuously possess or be in the process of reducing to possession the property which
he has found." MDM Salvage, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 631 F. Supp. 308, 311 (S.D. Fla. 1986). However, the same opinion also noted
that "[w]ith regard to the requirement of continuous possession, the law of finds is
unforgiving [citing Eads]. If a first finder maintains appropriate possession and control

of an identifiable abandoned wreck site, he may acquire the exclusive right to continue
recoveries." Id. Thus, the maritime context is necessary to expand the possession re-

quirement, so that the working salvor can acquire the right to reduce a cargo to physical
possession.
134.
135.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
Cobb Coin, 540 F. Supp. at 556.
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pansive interpretation of the possession requirement. 36
The CentralAmerica opinion provided a right to possession, not by physical seizure of the cargo, but by its remote
location. Seizure by robot is, however, an unduly narrow reading of the type of possession authorized by this opinion. The
initial location and continuous working of the wreck site, by
remote control, becomes the basis for a right to possess the
cargo. Indeed, while the temporary restraining order was
binding on the plaintiff's competitors, the plaintiff's crew had
the robot relocate the cargo to a central location. This "technological seizure" comes very close to physical seizure. It is
interesting that the court is willing to envision the plaintiff's
technology as this sort of extension; at the same time, however, the doctrine should be 1sparingly
used, only when a
37
impossible.
is
presence
manned
3.

A Suggested Approach

As framed in the Central America opinion, the issue of
which law applies is misleading. In fact, the salvor/finder
sought title to the wreck first under the law of finds, but falling back on a salvage award should that attempt fail. Policy
analysis dictates that this type of pleading is backwards. The
law of both finders and salvage has a deep-rooted interest in
locating the true owner of the wreck and its cargo. Holding
title in abeyance before it is confirmed in the salvor/finder
permits the court to advertise for the true owner to step forward. This happened in the CentralAmerica litigation; many
putative "true owners" stepped forward. Their claims were
136. In this sense, the CentralAmerica opinion is reminiscent of Keeble v. Heckeringill, 11 East 374, 103 Eng.Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1809) (protecting the owner of a decoy
pond from a neighbor's firing a musket frightening away waterfowl from the pond in an
action in trespass on the case: "[E]veryman that hath a property may employ it for his
pleasure and profit."). The Keeble opinion however emphasizes the control of competition. The neighbor with the gun could set up a competing decoy pond and fire a musket
to reduce the fowl to possession by killing them, but could not fire the musket to scare
away the fowl from the neighboring pond. A similar control of competition is evident
in the law of salvage when considering the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
137. Otherwise, the image of European claims to North America, based on a
sailor's sighting the coastline of the continent, comes readily to mind. See, e.g., Johnson
v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (discussing the English "right of discovery" of North
America, as based on the voyages of John Cabot-very much like the basis of the plaintiffs' right in this case to work the wreck site free of the interference of competitors).
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rejected, but the exercise was one which the law should encourage. The law of salvage should apply first. If no true
owner is found, the law of finders should award the prize to
the finder-not only for satisfying the elements of possession,
but also for acting as a "virtuous finder." The choice is not,
then, between the law of finders and of salvage. The better
formulation is to decide in which sequence they should apply.
The scenario described above might not always be the
most viable sequence. When, for example, so many potential
"true owners" come forward that the litigation expenses of
claiming title overwhelm the value of the wreck, the law of
finds should apply first to expeditiously quiet title in the
finder. The interests of the true owner may be so diffusely
held that only the finder can efficiently use the cargo. The
CentralAmerica litigation approaches this situation. Several
parties asserted owner's rights. In addition to the plaintiffs,
alleged insurers of the wreck came forward claiming subrogation rights. The court dismissed their claims, as it was not in
dispute that the wreck was long lost and only the plaintiff was
able to produce a map of its location.
However, the insurer's claims were not baseless. The
year after the sinking, the insurance companies entered into a
salvage contract with a salvor, containing a no-recovery, nopay provision. Nothing ever came of the salvor's efforts; he
was required to build a submarine; nothing in the record
shows that it was ever built. The insurers executed another
salvage contract in 1979. Meanwhile, the insurers had thrown
away all of their claims records and were unable to produce
invoices, bills of lading for the cargo, packing lists, or insurance policies on which to substantiate their subrogation
claims. They attempted to establish payment of claims by
newspaper accounts of the claims at the time they were made
and paid. If the insurance companies ever intended to assert a
subrogation right, why destroy those documents? "Their actions speak clearly. They had no hope or idea that they could
locate the Central America, and even if they located it, they
had no hope they could recover anything from it. They destroyed the documents and intended thereby to abandon any
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claim they might have."138
Although the technology used by the plaintiffs was invented approximately two decades ago, the insurers made no
effort to use it. They were offered a chance to participate in a
search in the early 1980s, but chose not to invest and appeared
late in the present litigation. They never listed their subrogation rights on inventories of assets for assessment of personal
property taxes payable to state officials. Their inaction again
spoke more loudly than the fact that they never expressly
waived their rights. 139 The insurers appear to be free-loaders.
This might militate in favor of applying the law of finders over
the law of salvage in this case. Moreover, once the recovery
was made, the court would have been unable to determine
which gold was insured and which was not. Even considering
the vast value of the cargo, intention to abandon this cargo
can be inferred from the insurers' inaction over the century
since the vessel went down. Title to the gold and other artifacts in the wreck was therefore vested in the finder.
The judge, writing this portion of the Central America
opinion, is dimissive of the insurer's claims, but perhaps he is
not dismissive enough. The finder was put to a good deal of
litigation expense to ward off these claims. This shortcoming
shows the value of the common law presumption of an abandonment by neglect and the passage of time. The judge would
not likely have been so dismissive if the claimant were an heir
of someone known to have had gold on board when the ship
went down. An individual claimant might have had more appeal on the equities, but such a claim would probably have
been deemed to be abandoned as well.140 Perhaps a presumption of abandonment of the uninsured gold from the wreck
would be a more appropriate rule for individual claims. Such
138. Central America, 742 F. Supp. at 1345 ("(R]ecovering it [the treasure] was
beyond the ability of any known means. Not only was this true in 1857, and five years
[the usual period of time during which the insurers saved the claims records] thereafter,
but continued to be true for some one hundred years thereafter.").
139. Id. at 1334 (some of the insurers had failed or ceased to do business, but in
their inventory of assets, the subrogation rights were not listed).
140. Press accounts of this find have described at least one such heir. See Ringle,

supra note 103, at Cl, col. 1 (describing a person whose great-great uncle had made a
fortune in California and was bringing it home when he drowned in this disaster).
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a claim is untested by this litigation so far.'41 The court's peremptory dismissal of some of the claims advanced by the insurance companies approaches a recognition of judicial
efficiency as a reason for dismissing the claims.
B.

The China

Indian River Recovery Company v. The China 142 involves
"concurrent possession." This maritime case involved a collection of charter and fishing boat owners and scuba divers
who brought an action to adjudicate their rights to a nineteenth century wreck in the Delaware Bay, off Lewes, Delaware. These parties gathered under the umbrella of a nonprofit corporation which, as a plaintiff sought to establish,
under the law of finders, a possessory right superior to that
of
143
a salvage company seeking to recover the same wreck.
The vessel in dispute was called The China, because its
cargo was a load of English ironstone dishes.'" The vessel is
located in forty feet of water, a comparatively shallow dive,
providing "the relatively rare opportunity for inexperienced
divers to recover souvenirs of their dives."'' 45 Expert testimony established that the china aboard the wreck has "little,
' 46
if any, intrinsic or market value."'
141. In addition to the insurers, claims were also made (and rejected) by Columbia
University, whose employees had made a sonar map of the wreck area in 1984 which
was allegedly used to locate the wreck site, and by the persons who paid the university
for this survey (one of whom later assigned his rights to a religious order). Associated
Press, Rejecting Claims, Judge Awards Gold Treasure to Its Discoverers, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 14, 1990, at A25, col. 1 (reporting the rejection of claims by the university, the
treasurer hunters, and the monks).
142. 645 F..Supp. 141 (D. Del. 1986).
143. Id. at 144. The opinion minimizes the importance of the presence of this corporate umbrella, and instead focuses on the community of interests involved in using
the wreck as a site both for sports diving and a local charter boat industry.
144. Id. at 142. The location of the vessel was established by the federal government's National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration in 1970. The location was outside of the territorial waters of Delaware and New Jersey, in the federal
zone within Delaware Bay. "Word of the discovery quickly spread throughout the
scuba diving community. Sport divers immediately began diving upon the wreck and
bringing to the surface the accessible ironstone dishes, cups, and saucers that comprised
the ship's cargo." Id. at 143.
145. Id. (at the time of the trial, some 10,000 pieces of ironstone ware had been
recovered).
146. Id. (no individual diver ever sought a salvage award for any find).
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1. The Law of Finds
The court began by stating that "the common law of
finds governs this action. "147 Under this branch of the law,
proof of possession and control are prerequisites to an award
of title. However, the court continued, "the law.., does not
require one who discovers abandoned property actually to
have it in hand." Rather, the law "protects the rights of persons who discover abandoned property, and who are actually
engaged in 'reducing it to possession,' to complete this project
without interference." In addition, the plaintiff's right to protect the livelihood of the shareholders of the plaintiff corporation does not require a certain time-table for reducing the
cargo to possession. For such a plaintiff, representing the local industry to service amateur divers, constructive possession
through regular diving is sufficient to satisfy the continuity of
effort required of finders to work free of competitive interference. The plaintiff's "charter-boat-captain members rely
upon the wreck's availability as a diving destination for a substantial portion of their business."1 48 A short term commercial salvage operation was, the opinion states, "not
intrinsically superior." Instead, it considered a "viable commercial enterprise" operated by the plaintiff's members to
have precedence. So saying, the court issued a permanent in49

junction against the commercial salvor.'

2.

Abandonment by the Vessel's Owner
The threshold question in Eads involved the abandonment of the steamboat America by its owners. The court inferred abandonment from the elapsed time between the boat's
wreck and the salvage operation, during which the true owners asserted no right. The removal of boilers and other valuable objects, followed by further neglect, enhanced its finding of
abandonment. This finding was crucial in determining applicable law. One advantage of the law of finders, as opposed to
147. Id. at 144.
148. Id. (stating that the diver's salvage by hand "guarantees the integrity of the
vessel's structure as an artificial reef for abundant marine life, but assures at least fifteen,
and perhaps fifty, more years that the wreck can be used for recreational and commercial fishing and diving.").
149. Id. at 145.
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the law of salvage, is that the finder works in the absence of an
owner, while a salvor is presumed to be working for an owner.
Thus, when there is no true owner or where there has been an
abandonment, the law of finders will apply. American courts
have applied this law to ship wrecks "where no owner is likely
to come forward."150
In the CentralAmerica litigation, there were several parties asserting owner's rights. The opinion in The China did
not address the abandonment issue, but the notoriety of the
wreck in the locale indicates that the true owner either knew
or should have known about the location of the wreck. Failure to act in the face of such knowledge should have made the
presumption of abandonment stronger. Here, a diffuse set of
finders obtained control of the wreck, not because the commercial salvor could not efficiently bring the wreck to the surface. Rather, the non-profit corporation won because the
finders devised an efficient method to spread the benefits of the
find around the community. Here, sharing finders win, on the
basis of the cargo's communal value. That the law should discourage such a community of interests seems unthinkable:
that the salvor tried, reprehensible.
V. CONCLUSION
Since Eads was decided, citation to it has been sparing.
Even so, its application has been frequent enough to create
two groups of discernible citations. The first is as authority
for clearing title through the rules of abandonment. The economic utility of such authority is most evident in cases authorizing secondary or scavenger recovery of a resource, such as
sunken timber or "sinkers." The objective is to place goods
back in circulation that were previously not valued sufficiently
to be marketable.
The second use is more recent. As salvage operations became more sophisticated and expensive, the rule of capture
came back into vogue. It has been particularly useful in salvage cases arising off of the Florida coast. Much is at stake in
150.

Commonwealth v. Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc., 403 Mass. 501, 504,

531 N.E.2d 549, 551 (1988) (holding that a finder was not required to apply for state
archeological permit because the federal admiralty law of finds, rather than state law,
defined the finder's rights).
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these cases, but considerable investment is required to stake
and work the claim and to establish operations which will
constructively take possession of the stake area. The rule of
capture in Eads proves adequate to the task. This rule directs
the court's attention to the need for the active and productive
use of inventions and investment, and in doing so moves the
law of property firmly into the twentieth century. This gives
the law a tension it reflects today.
In the salvage cases, the rule of capture is used not just to
protect individual effort, but effort backed by considerable
capital investment. In Eads, the rewards for individual effort
and one man's invention are close to simultaneous. In the
modem salvage cases, the investors appear more passive, energizing with capital the effort of others. In these cases, the
function of the rule of capture seems to shift again to reinforce
the role of accumulated capital. Viewed in this light, then, it
is refreshing to see the opinion in The China reinforcing the
value of a wrecked cargo to a community of interests invested
in a local economy.
A caveat, remains: Beware of models for property law
that present economic or other social science dichotomies.
We know much about Eads, but next to nothing about Brazelton. If we knew more about Brazelton, could we not as easily
ask if the competitors in Eads played out some psycho-drama
amongst themselves, or if they were of different generations,
or if some of Eads' crew had been employed by the competitor? If we compiled psychological profiles of both the litigants
in Eads, we would be more obviously employing twentiethcentury methods to understand nineteenth-century personalties. A chronological method is present when the dichotomies
of today's economics are applied as well. Today's concepts sit
uneasily on yesterday's events; but there is still reason to apply
them if for no other reason than that in law school, it is the
case method that we teach. The rules of old cases need to be
put to new uses.

